Clement Attlee and Winston Churchill: Assessing the ‘Post War-Consensus’ After World War II
The post-war consensus is a concept that represents the period of political co-operation amongst the major parties in post-war Britain, starting from the end of the Second World War in 1945, and ending in the late-1970s, where it was repudiated by Conservative Party leader Margaret Thatcher. The consensus promoted and endorsed a generous welfare state, high taxes, nationalisation, strong trade unions and heavy regulations, and most importantly nationalised healthcare and formed the National Health Service. However, recent historians have debated whether the “post-war consensus” truly existed, believing the period of cooperation and harmony to be widely exaggerated. Arguments against the post-war consensus have appeared on both sides of the political spectrum, for instance Conservative Kevin Jeffreys believed that there was considerable contention from both sides towards policies, and Labour historian Ben Pimlott, who believed the post-war consensus to be a “mirage, an illusion which rapidly fades the closer one gets to it”. However, this essay will argue, in alignment with the views of political scientists Dennis Kavanagh and Peter Morris, that although there was criticisms and disagreements over certain policies, this does not negate the entire period of ‘consensus’ which undoubtedly took place following the war, as there were clear and significant continuities that occurred in regards to policies towards the economy, education, trade unions, full employment and welfare programs.
Understanding the origins of post-war consensus also furthers the argument that there were clear and significant attempts at revitalising post-war Britain. The thesis of a ‘consensus’ was developed during the 1930s, led by Liberal intellectuals Paul Addison and John Maynard Keynes, where support for a coherent package of policies, such as a broad welfare state and a mixed economy, became particularly attractive as the wartime government promised an improved post-war Britain that would engage all strands of society. The foundations of the post-war consensus can be traced back to the Beveridge Report of 1942, a report by liberal economist William Beveridge, which described a more inclusive welfare state in Britain. The report aimed to bring exhaustive reform to Britain, highlighting the “five giants on the road of reconstruction… want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness.” The report also recommended the appointment of a minister to control all insurance schemes, as well as encouraging old age pensions, funeral grants, maternity grants, pensions for widows and people injured at work, and most importantly, the establishment of the National Health Service and creation of the modern welfare state. Additionally, the post-war consensus endorsed a mixed economy with nationalisation of the major industries, as well as Keynesian economics – which promoted a more active role of the government to “manage overall demand” in order for there to be a “balance between demand and output”. These policies were instituted by both the Labour and Conservative parties in the post-war period until the Secondary banking crisis of 1973-1975, which ended the post-war economic boom. However, during this period, Keynesian economics dominated and characterised British politics, and unemployment averaged less than 3% during this period.
The shock landslide victory of the Labour Party in the 1945 general election was also a major benchmark and indicator of the post-war consensus, as the policies that would be implemented by Clement Attlee and the Labour government laid the foundations of the consensus. Using the Beveridge Report and Keynesian economics, Attlee formulated “The Attlee Settlement”, which intended to target five areas: full employment, a mixed economy, conciliation of trade unions, welfare state as well as a fallback from empire. Another significant indicator of the post-war consensus was the Conservative Party’s acceptance of these policies and pledge to not reverse them, and this pledge is manifested in the 1947 Industrial Charter. The Charter is widely considered to represent a seminal moment in post-war Conservatism, placing emphasis on labour rights and opposing protectionism, as well as accepting the idea of a mix economy. Although the Charter was a source of debate amongst the Conservative Party Conference of 1947, with Churchill initial reaction ‘but I do not agree with a word of this’, The Charter was still well received by the British public and sold around 2.5 million copies, and according to Peter Dorey, helped “rehabilitate” the Conservative Party following the Second World War.
When one views the areas of consensus and policies that were formed, the concept of a ‘post-war consensus’ becomes far more apparent. When Churchill and Attlee headed the coalition government during war, they signed a sequence of white papers that committed to a reformed and enhanced welfare state following the war. The promises intended to expand education, welfare programmes, housing, and nationalisation of weak industries. In terms of education, the 1944 Education Act was the most significant legislation that was passed, and was written by Conservative statesman Rab Butler and Labour deputy James Chuter Ed. The Act would become regarded as a key part of the consensus as it broadened and modernised the education setup. The consensus also called for the building of new universities to expand the education base of society, and the Labour Party did not prevent the system of elite public schools, as they became part of the consensus. Although the Conservatives constantly boasted they could do a significantly better job of running the National Health Service, as shown by Duncan Tanner’s essay detailing the opposition to the NHS, crucially, they did not challenge the socialised medicine of the NHS. Although there were initially great disputations from doctors in Minister of Health Aneurin Bevan’s plans, he managed to persuade the doctors to approve by giving several concessions, knowing that there would be no health service without the doctors on board. From 1948 to 1972, the NHS experienced small industrial strikes, but remained largely free of conflict and strikes.
There is much to suggest that there was considerable political cooperation amongst the major parties post-war in regard to foreign policy. Peter Morris and Dennis Kavanagh point out the significance of the Second World War played in regard to building a unified and acceptant outlook amongst all parties, as the war yielded these shared sets of values. They outline the importance of the war time cabinet, Atlanticism, the development of an independent nuclear deterrent and the process of imperial disengagement, they claim “all originated in the 1945 Labour Government and were subsequently continued… by its successors.” However, it is important to note that there was not complete consensus in regards to foreign policy, and there was disagreement, primarily concerning the introduction of the Commonwealth. The Labour party opposed the Conservative’s ‘imperial rhetoric’ and sought to create a “multicultural Commonwealth”. But the Conservative party were reluctant to return colonial possessions to their owners and many within the party disagreed with the gradual process of independence and even less with decolonisation, and this issue was “an important theme of partisan conflict”. Nonetheless, this disputations did not negate the consensus that took place regarding foreign policy, an area which had always caused bitter resentment from both parties, as shown by the eventual process of decolonisation that would follow under Conservative leader Macmillan, and the adoption of a Commonwealth state.
The ‘collapse’ of the post-war consensus is another indicator that there was indeed a consensus, showing that the lasting cooperation amongst parties was ended by outside pressures and the growing demands on the consensus. Global events, such as the oil crisis of 1973, placed immense pressure on the post-war consensus, and was only intensified by domestic issues, which included industrial unrest and high inflation. Political scientist Anthony King believed it to be these outside pressures, coinciding with the increased demand on the government during the consensus years created an imbalance between what was possible to deliver, and the demands being created. “More demands means more government intervention, which generates yet more expectations.” Therefore, the “’winter of discontent’ destroyed Britain’s collectivist consensus and discredited the Keynesian welfare state”. Therefore, the origin and an ending of the consensus can be clearly outlined, as well as its legacy, as although Thatcher reversed several elements of the consensus, she kept many of the key foundations, such as nationalised health care.
In order to truly understand this perspective, the opposing view that the post-war consensus never truly existed must also be recognised. This argument stems from the idea that there were still many policies that the Conservatives did not support, the main being the process of how the NHS should be implemented. This has led to the belief amongst recent historians that the post-war consensus was over-exaggerated, and the leading figure that opposed the post-war consensus was Kevin Jeffreys, who stated “much of Labours programme after 1945, it must be remembered, was fiercely contested at the time”, citing the example of the Conservatives voting against the NHS, as well as the Conservative minister of health, Henry Willock, opposing the nationalisation of hospitals. However, Paul Addison retorts this claim, stating that had the Conservatives capitalised on the Beveridge report, it would have been their party that had the powerful mandate for dictating policies and not the Labour Party. Ben Pimlott’s claimed that ‘Butskellism’ – satirical term used when referring to the ‘consensus’ – meant outer cooperation in regard to economic policy, but in practice, it was a term of abuse, noting that there was still sustained arguments when it came to taxation, physical control and monetary policy. Despite these sustained disputations, there was still a significant multi-partisan national consensus with social and economic policy, the welfare state, educational reform, full employment, a mixed economy, government regulation and Keynesian macroeconomics, and thus a post-war consensus is still evident. The three major parties, as well as industries, the labour movement, and the financial community, broadly accepted these policies, with only the question of nationalisation on certain industries being a grey area.
That being said, there is still the claim of Ralph Milband, who believed the consensus was too modest and prevented a fully socialised society. Angus Calder goes further, claiming the reforms did not match the wartime sacrifice, believing the eventual consensus to be a “cynical betrayal” of what was envisioned to be a modern post-war society. However, this argument stems from the belief that the consensus was an ideological agreement. Therefore, Dean Blackburn’s argument that the post-war consensus was an epistemological one, rather than an ideological consensus, is more appropirate. He notes that there were clear systematic differences between Labour party and the Conservative party, such as the Labour party envisioning an egalitarian and equal with a multicultural Commonwealth, with the Conservatives far more disinclined to this approach. Therefore, Blackburn states that the parties instead shared what he called “epistemological beliefs”, as they had “similar ideas about the appropriate political conduct” as well as a “shared common suspicion of the notion that politics could serve fixed ‘ends”, believing that “evolutionary change was preferable to radical”. Blackburn’s main argument is that instead of “being rooted in ideological beliefs about desirable ‘ends’ of political activity”, the consensus emerged from “epistemological assumptions and the political propositions that followed them”.
Although there were sustained disputations throughout this period and the idea of a harmonious fully-cooperative post-war society may have been exaggerated to some extent by certain commentators, taking into consideration the clear attempts at improving post-war Britain, the manifestation of several policies such as the nationalisation of health service, a Commonwealth, education acts and adoption of Keynesian macroeconomics, as well as its collapse due to the growing pressures and demands that these policies brought, it is evident that there was a post-war consensus in Britain during the period 1945-1970.