The Greatest Liberal President of the 20th-Century? Evaluating the Presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Franklin Roosevelt is credited with bringing America through its greatest economic crisis, creating a welfare state, winning World War II, and being the only president to be elected four times, and is consequently placed within the pantheon of American presidents alongside George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. This essay will demonstrate that whilst Roosevelt’s presidency was no doubt among the most influential in the 20th-century, there are crucial shortcomings in several areas that must be addressed in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of his presidency. This will be achieved by evaluating his domestic policies in the first section, and then his foreign policy in the second section.

The Hoover Administration was condemned for its inadequate response to the Great Depression as Roosevelt won the 1932 election on a landslide. He promised the American people a “New Deal” to counteract the desperate economic situation, but this was neither a fixed plan nor a set ideology. Rather, it was experimental and constantly developing and despite Roosevelt’s highly proclaimed pragmatism, this often led to improvisation and incoherence as certain policies proved far less adaptable in practice due to the haphazard nature in which they were instituted (Walter LeFeber). Nonetheless, the Democratic Congressional victory in 1932 coupled with the exigencies of the crisis empowered Roosevelt to pass an unprecedented amount of legislation in his first “100 Days”. Consequently, he was able to meet the immediate task of regulating the stock market and banking system through the Emergency Banking Act, Glass-Seagall Act, and Securities Exchange Act. Unemployment was another area in which the Roosevelt administration tackled vigorously, as the PWA, CWA, and CCC provided work for 8m people over 8 years and created 650,000 miles of highways, 125,000 buildings, and thousands of public parks (LeFeber). The centrepiece of Roosevelt’s domestic policy was his social reforms and the Social Security Act (1935) is regarded as one of the most important pieces of legislation in the 20th-century, introducing pensions, benefits, and compensation for workers, and had the most long-lasting influence as it continued into the 21st-century. Other social policies that were passed complimented the Social Security Act, such as Fairs Labours Standard Act, which provided a minimum wage, and the Wagner Act, which increased the power of unions. This was all consolidated by Roosevelt’s “Fireside Chats”, as he utilised the radio to increase support for his policies – a factor which no doubt contributed to the “father figure” image that would develop.

But there are significant limitations of the New Deal that must be addressed. His industrial policies, centred on the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), were most controversial as they constituted an unprecedented intervention by the federal government into the country’s industry. After a long dispute, the NRA was eventually declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court and was rescinded in 1936. His agricultural reforms would receive the same fate as the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), which intended to pay farmers to produce less to increase farm prices, was also struck down by the Supreme Court for the same reason. Additionally, many of the 1.6m African American tenant farmers and sharecroppers were left unemployed as a result of the AAA due to the reduced need for labourers. In terms of unemployment relief, programmes continually fought attempts to cut their budget (WPA cost $10.7b across 7 years) and never helped all those in relief as unemployment steadily increased throughout the decade. Furthermore, many of the relief programmes that were dispensed locally were influenced by racial biases, particularly in the South where African Americans were routinely discriminated against due to segregation practices. Labour agitations were on the rise, with 1.5m workers going on strike in 1934 (the highest since 1919), and this in conjunction with pressure applied by Senator Robert Wagner pushed Roosevelt to sign the Wagner Act (LeFeber).

Roosevelt was re-elected on a landslide in 1936 but his second term would prove to be far more complex than his first. His campaign centred on the opposition to the New Deal with the upper class criticising the federal governments intervention, the strengthening of unions, and particularly the increase in tax (Wealth Tax Act increased taxes on those earning over $50,000 per-year significantly and raised them to 75% for those making over $1,000,000). Roosevelt said, “Never before have these forces of organised money been so opposed to one candidate as they are to me. They are unanimous of their hatred to me...” (Speech at Madison Square Garden, October 1936). Roosevelt used the landslide victory as a mandate to take on those that opposed his New Deal policies, namely the Supreme Court. His plan to “pack” the court with liberal Justices to counter the Conservative Justices – who had already struck down the AAA and NIRA – was rejected by the Congress but there were other negative consequences from the debacle. Many believed it to undermine the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court as accusations of authoritarianism were branded against Roosevelt. The main repercussion was the divide it created in the Democratic Party, many of whom opposed the court packing plan, which damaged Roosevelt’s support in Congress during his second and third term. While the continued poverty and mass unemployment contributed to his re-election, it paradoxically reflected the New Deal’s shortcomings. 8m remain unemployed when the economy went into another recession in 1937, which saw a further increase in unemployment. Southern conservative Democrats began voting with Republicans against Democratic policies as the New Deal’s popularity gradually diminished.

Focus had shifted to his foreign-policy during his third term, but Roosevelt was still determined to pass progressive legislations. By 1943, the New Deal’s momentum had ended as Congress – despite having a Democratic majority – had scrapped the WPA, CCC, and NYA due to the gains made by the Republicans in the House and Senate creating a conservative consensus. Roosevelt attempted to pass a second bill of rights (Economic Bill of Rights) in 1944 which would guarantee security of healthcare, housing, and education, but was again rejected by Congress. He was able to pass one last piece of legislation – the G.I. Bill – which enabled soldiers returning from the war vocational training, healthcare, and housing, as he learnt from the mistakes of veterans returning in World War I. Outside of the New Deal, Roosevelt controversially passed Executive Order 9066, which permitted the interment of over 100,000 Japanese Americans, and did not introduce any major civil rights legislation despite the various opportunities to do so (i.e. Philip Randolph 1941, lynching’s in 1941-42, and racial tensions in 1943). Nevertheless, African American support in northern cities increased – partly through Eleanor Roosevelt’s popularity but also due to New Deal policies such as the WPA – and consolidated the coalition of liberal support which would see the Democratic Party dominate national politics for the next generation. Additionally, his reforms enhanced the powers of the federal government as his presidency set a precedent of government intervention, referred to later as “New Deal liberalism”, that remained part of liberal political thinking right up until Lyndon Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ in the 1960s. But this must be seen alongside its limitations. Not only was there an absence in civil rights legislation and an increase in federal debt, but unemployment persisted and was only ended by the demand of wartime production with the onset of World War II – not the New Deal. Furthermore, the liberal consensus that began with Roosevelt and ended with Johnson in 1968, which championed an activist federal government and welfare state, culminated in the conservative backlash during the 1970s up until the 1990s which would reverse all of these ideas. When evaluating Roosevelt’s domestic policies, there is a consistent theme of short-term success and long-term limitations.

Despite Roosevelt’s first two-terms focusing on domestic issues, he was still interested in shaping American foreign-policy. His approach was underpinned by several principles, notably his hero Theodore Roosevelt’s belief in internationalism and the safeguarding of the balance of world power. Second was the Wilsonian vision of a concerted international effort to maintain peace through an international organisation and free trade, having previously served in the Woodrow Wilson administration. Last was his own unique belief in the necessity of basing foreign-policy on domestic consent (Arthur Schlesinger Jr.), which would greatly affect his decision-making when shaping foreign-policy. Roosevelt’s first foreign-policy strategy was the “Good Neighbour Policy”, as after years of American intervention in the region, the Montevideo Convention (1933) signed by Roosevelt renounced America’s right to unilaterally intervene in Latin America. Furthermore, Roosevelt was able to negotiate trade agreements with other countries after the Reciprocal Tariff Act (1934) passed in Congress which significantly reducing tariff levels and tripled trade between the US and Latin American countries in his first two-terms (LeFeber). Roosevelt also extended recognition to the Soviet Union in 1933 after relations had eased and was keen to engage in large-scale trade agreements with them, but this never materialised. All of these foreign-policy initiatives reflected that Roosevelt’s internationalist sentiments began from the very start of his first-term, but this was prevented from developing due to the isolationist fervour that swept the American public.

The US had a long history of remaining clear of “entangling alliances”, but isolationist sentiment was particularly poignant during the 1930s. This arose not only from the need to focus on domestic issues, but the troubling memories of World War I, unpaid war debts, and the belief that bankers, munition manufacturers, and economic interests drove the country into their last war. Roosevelt was no doubt aware of the isolationist sentiment and was keen not to antagonise those in Congress that were isolationists as many were also supportive of his domestic policies, and did not once mention his foreign-policy beliefs, such as his previous admiration for Wilson’s League of Nations. But this was not to say that Roosevelt wanted to remain neutral as he immediately recognised the threat of Nazi Germany when he took to office, showcased by his support of gaining membership to the World Court and initiative to create an alliance in Geneva if there was a threat to peace. However, Congress rejected both proposals instead passing a series of Neutrality Acts from 1935-1937 which placed an embargo on shipments to belligerents. Roosevelt opposed the acts privately, even asking for a provision to grant sales to nations that were attacked, but this was refused as he reluctantly signed the Neutrality Acts in order to maintain political capital for his domestic policies. Roosevelt’s failure to overcome isolationist opposition in his first two-terms, despite having a foreign-policy agenda, marked a significant foreign-policy failure as it was due to this that the American response to the worsening international situation during the late-1930s was so idle. The US were completely irresponsive to the advancements made by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, particularly in the case of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), where Roosevelt later expressed his regret in not aiding the Spanish Republicans against the Nationalists (Schlesinger). Other instances included the Japanese invasion of China (1937) and Nanking Massacre (1938), and despite US and UN condemnation, the Neutrality Act’s prevented Roosevelt from offering any aid to the Chinese, settling on trading embargoes on the Japanese. Had Roosevelt not been so reluctant to provoke Congress and public opinion and fought against isolationism, the Axis powers’ influence could have been curtailed much sooner.

Even after foreign-policy took centre-stage in Roosevelt’s third-term, isolationist sentiment remained an obstacle as he was admonished by America First, Charles Lindbergh, and other isolationists for flouting the Neutrality Acts by agreeing to the Destroyers for Bases Agreement (1940) and Lend-Lease (1941). However, the declaration of war and subsequent events reflected many strengths in Roosevelt’s foreign-policy and leadership. His famous “Infamy Speech” to Congress led to the unanimous decision of declaring war against Japan, and consequently Germany and Italy. This began Roosevelt’s depiction of the war as a crusade to protect freedom and democracy from fascism and dictatorships, which he effectively conveyed to the American public. But the majority of his successes came by learning from the mistakes of World War I and the Wilson administration. Whereas Wilson never made the US an official ally or meet with the Allied leaders, Roosevelt did, conducting secret meetings with Winston Churchill and drafting the Atlantic Charter. Unlike Wilson, Roosevelt also named Republicans in his War and Navy Departments, and the Lend-Lease did not expect repayment, unlike the loans of WWI, and Roosevelt did not wait for the declaration of war to begin his draft – unlike Wilson. Nonetheless, his leadership during the war was not faultless and there are limitations that should be acknowledged. First was the ineffectiveness use of his intelligence as Roosevelt instituted the OSS, but they did not cooperate with the other agencies as Roosevelt was fed different information from different groups, revealing weaknesses in the coordination of his information. Additionally, Roosevelt seldom appointed policy positions and refused to acknowledge the difference between the nation being at war and being “short of war”, as his inexplicit responses often proved to be hard to understand and confusing for his cabinet members (William Leuchtenburg).

Roosevelt’s postwar planning also appears to be successful as he played a crucial role in the founding of the United Nations, as well as learning from the mistakes of Wilson’s failures with the League of Nations by including Republicans. Roosevelt believed the UN to be his most influential legacy, and indeed in terms of foreign-policy, it was, but there were limitations too, notably his naivety in dealing with the Soviet Union during the Tehran (1943) and Yalta Conferences (1945). Although he held little leverage over the USSR as they had control over Eastern Europe, his conciliatory approach – as opposed to the hardliner stance of his successors – meant the Declaration of Liberated Europe was interpreted by those in the Kremlin as allowing them to install puppet governments throughout their sphere of influence. Additionally, Roosevelt had to draw back on his anti-imperialism stance due to Churchill’s commitment to it. Other factors to consider are Roosevelt’s age as he was frail and weak by Yalta and would not be present at the following Potsdam Conference or witness the Allied victory. With the war not being over and a decision yet to be made over Japan, his death therefore catapulted Harry Truman to the presidency at a critical juncture, and this was compounded by Roosevelt’s reticent approach as Truman was not briefed on the nuances and details of his own ideas.

Although Roosevelt’s domestic and foreign policies appear to be manifestly effective as the US recovered from the Depression and emerged from WW II as a superpower, it is important to note the shortcomings as Roosevelt’s highly venerated legacy blurred many key details. For instance, the New Deal did not end the Depression but the war, his unpopularity in Congress led to many policies being scrapped, and his leadership during WWII was not free of error. That notwithstanding, his presidency was amongst the most impressive as he set a precedent for an activist federal government, welfare state, and proposals such as the Social Security Act and United Nations are still in effect today.