“The Gunpowder Empires”: Discerning the Myth
The 17th-century superpowers have tended to be depicted as part of one integrated international system that extended from the Atlantic to the Straits of Malacca. Indeed, they had many similarities aside from religion, from a common Turko-Mongolian heritage to a shared Persian courtly culture, but this essay will argue that the fundamental nature of their differences significantly outweigh their commonalities, and this will be demonstrated in several ways. Firstly, by situating the empires within their historiography, this will clarify why the empires dissimilarities must take precedence over their commonalities. Secondly, by describing their historic, regional, and ideological differences, this will reflect the structural dissimilarities that lay at the very heart of these empires. This will then delve into religious differences to challenge the narrative that religion ‘tied’ these empires together, as there were considerable variations in both their understanding and implementation of Islam. Although focusing on the 17th-century, factors outside of 1600-1700 will be mentioned to convey wider dissimilarities that transcended time.
The historiography of these empires, although vast, usually follow similar lines of argument. For Islamic commentators, the flourishing of three Islamic empires represented an era of achievement unseen since the Abbasid Golden Age and Mongol invasions several centuries earlier, and thus followed Ibn Khaldun’s paradigm of the “natural lifespan of dynasties”. For Western historians, the boundaries between Christian Europe and the Islamic empires marked a point of demarcation between the West and East, representing barriers of religion, commerce, and movement. 20th-century historiographical works, such as Hodgson and McNeil’s ‘Gunpowder’ thesis, highlight the empires military achievements as key contributors to their success. All three interpretations infer an underlying connectedness in which the empires represented one bloc, but this neglects key differences in the empires origins, regions, and evolution, meaning such interpretations are both restrictive and insufficient. Instead, the 21st-century historiography, such as Stephen Dale and Douglas Streusand’s works which note the complexity of the regions and that religion was one component amongst many, are far more comprehensive and appropriate. Additionally, Ottoman, Mughal, and Safavid archives were varied within themselves, with Ottoman literature being far greater in depth and size and Mughal and Safavid records being sparse, constrained to the 20th-century, and focusing on less time, with two Safavid centuries compared to the Ottoman’s six.
“To master Ottoman historiography is a lifework; Safavid historiography takes a year.”
Therefore, the Gunpowder Empires must be recognised as multifaceted and dynamic bodies unto themselves, in which their separate political and religious traditions changed over time and impacted their populations in different ways.
The political climate in the Near East had reached an “impasse” after Abbasid rule fragmented in the 11-12th centuries, meaning the centralisation of power and durability of the Mughal, Safavid, and Ottoman Empires reflected that not only did the empires share a common heritage, but faced similar dilemmas as all three managed to overcome this “impasse”. Nevertheless, Streusand maintains that they overcame this in different ways, during different timelines, and under different conditions, and this was due to the empires contrasting ideological perspectives, regional circumstances, and historic development. Whereas expansion and conquest defined the Mughals and Ottomans, the Safavids differed. Aside from the establishment of Shi’ism, Safavid conquest did not result in change but a continuum of the Aq Qoyunlu and Timurid regimes that they united in which the Qizilbash tribe dominated. Only after Shah Abbas I’s (1588-1629) reforms a century later did the Safavids transform from tribal confederations into a bureaucratic empire, and Qizilbash influence was curtailed. Additionally, Safavid ideology combined religion and “ghuluww”, a concept based on the dissent against the dominant faiths and the establishments that supported them. The Safavid founder, Ismail I, united the tribal confederations not only under the banner of Twelver Shi’ism, but with the promise of an alternative order to the imperial religious establishment that was the Ottomans – a factor unique to the Safavids.
The Ottomans ideology revolved around frontier ghazi warfare and Turko-Irano-Islamic kingship, and these were the principle reasons as to why they were greater in size, power, and duration compared to the Safavids and Mughals. It should be noted that “Ghaza” as a concept is unlike the Islamic principle of jihad as it involved a combination of Turkic and Byzantine folklore that predated Islam, and therefore was unique to the Ottomans. Their claims to legitimacy and sovereignty were numerous and constantly evolving, as the military victories of Osman and Orhan made them frontier chieftains and rulers of large and diverse populations. Subsequent Sultans projected themselves as worldly sovereigns, bringing with them ulama from the Seljuk kingdoms who imported an agrarian ethos, Turko-Islamic conceptions of kingship, and formalised Islamic legal codes (the Shari’a). Streusand adds another ideological perspective unique to the Ottomans was their belief that they were the “heirs of the Roman Empire”. This was not simply geographical coincidence, but Anatolia was called “Rum” (Rome) by the Turkmen, and Sultans referred to themselves as “Sultan al-Rum” (Sultan of Rome). Halil Inalcik elaborates, “Even before the conquest of Constantinople, the Ottomans appeared as protectors of the Church and considered... it part of their administrative system.” Later Turkish sources attribute mystical folklore (i.e. Osman dreamed he was destined to rule a kingdom) and religious narratives (Ottomans were heirs of the Prophet and 7th-century Rashidun Caliphate) as also being part of their ideological composition. Unlike the Ottomans and Safavids, the Mughals were not centred on ideology and religion, but regional and ancestral factors as they established a new polity in lands that were already Muslim. Babur proclaimed his heritage traced back to Timur and Genghis Khan, as he sought to re-establish Timurid primacy. But the divisive, unstable, and mountainous terrains of India meant that local rulers remained in place, owing nominal allegiance to the Mughals. Regional instability, Babur’s unfixed ideology, and Humayun’s military defeats meant that the Mughals not only had different ideas of sovereignty, but were much slower than the Ottomans and Safavids in asserting regional control. Therefore, despite all three empires beginning as tribal confederations and expanding through military victories, there were clear distinctions in their origins and claims to legitimacy.
This led to the implementation of different political, economic, and military structures. The Safavids had less wealth, size, and power and the ecology of the Iranian plateau meant that pastoral nomadism dominated. In contrast, the Ottomans and Mughals were more agrarian, as the heavily watered plains of India and the array of climates possessed by Ottoman regions enabled them to control major trade networks and enjoy agricultural prosperity, whereas the arid highlands of Persia meant the Safavids relied on single commodity exports (i.e. silk in 1600). Streusand maintains that whilst the Ottomans and Mughals had no difficulty in recognising the Safavids as rivals, had it not been for the increased global trading of the 16th-century, the Safavids would have remained a tribal confederation and not qualified as a Gunpowder Empire. Contrastingly, the Ottomans and Mughals economic prosperity and territorial expansion led to the development of vast and complex bureaucratic systems.
Ottoman bureaucracy evolved as it expanded eventually developing into a multifaceted pyramid of order, seen by the networks of viziers, governors, Janissaries, Ghulam’s (“young male slaves”), quls (royal concubines in harems), and ulama (religious scholars). They also acquired a major non-Muslim population – more so than the Mughals and Safavids – and incorporated them into their empire through the millet (“community”) system, which granted Jews and Christians the right to form semi-autonomous communities. The Ottomans relied on slaves more than any other empire in order to meet the demands of their expansion, and through the devshirme (“collection”) they were able to recruit Balkan and Christian slaves from their vast principalities, and with the Ottomans hierarchical military structure, this enabled them to reach the highest offices. Mughal bureaucratic systems flourished too via expansion and economic prosperity, but were implemented differently. Although the Mughal imperial army secured military victories, they relied on zanmindars (local landlords) and mansabdars (officeholders) to sustain authority and therefore had to subsume peasant soldiers. Not only was Mughal central administrations more mobile as the capital moved with the emperor (Mughal rulers spent 35% of their time traveling on campaigns), but their bureaucracy lacked the elaborate hierarchy of the Ottoman administrations. There was less focus on slaves, which were so crucial to the Ottomans, as there was no devshirme equivalent and the lines were blurred between imperial subjects and servants meaning slaves could not occupy important positions, and the Mughal harem (zenana) held far less influence. There was also no Mughal parallel to the Ottomans millets either, as there was no hierarchical organisation of Mughal subjects and therefore no distinction between Hindus and Muslims. The Mughal bureaucracy instead resembled Timurid, Turko-Mongolian, and Persian elements as opposed to the Turko-Islamic and Shari’a orientated Ottomans. The Persian culture of the Mughal courts was not to say there was political similarities with the Safavids either, as Persian tribal confederacy meant their central and provincial administrations were far more fluid and unfixed, which continued even after Abbas I’s bureaucratic reforms, evidenced by the tribal resurgence when the empire collapsed in the 18th-century.
By the 17th-century, the empires ideological and structural differences were more than apparent. Historians regard this century to be a ‘transition period’ for the Ottomans, as their imperial apogee – which witnessed the conquest of Constantinople and subsequent ‘Golden Age’ – had long passed, while the Safavids were believed to be reaching their peak under the reign of “Abbas the Great”. But this was not reflected statistically, as the Ottomans controlled greater territory (8m Safavid population to 20m Ottoman in 1600), had a stronger economic system, and obtained a larger military force (45,000 Janissaries compared to Safavids 10,000 imperial bodyguards in 1600 – even after Abbas’ reforms). Furthermore, Ottoman and Mughal agricultural and commercial achievements meant their capitals became major centres of international trade, as they dominated the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean trade routes and sought to expand long-distance trade in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean. The Mughals differed most as they experienced more change in the 17th-century than the other empires, with the reforms of Akbar and Aurangzeb at the either end of the century offering completely different organisational setups, whilst their economic affluence witnessed a period of “economic growth and vitality”, as their population reached 150m during this century. Structural similarities can be pinpointed as Blake noted that all three empires developed from an appanage system, described the Safavid-Shi’a-Qizilbash warriors as being “indistinguishable” from their Sunni brethren’s in the Ottoman and Mughal empires due to their Turko-Mongolian heritage, and highlighted that the empires agrarian economies led to their military forces being paid in the same way, through land revenue, as the Mughal jagirdari system mirrored the Ottoman’s timar. But these similarities are made insignificant in comparison to the fundamental structural differences in their political, economic, and military organisation, which were not only subject to constant change – therefore differing within themselves – but stretch all the way back to the ideological and regional differences from the empires origins.
Another source of differentiation is religion. It is understandable why one may assume religion connected the empires as they shared traditions of Salah (daily prayers), Jumma (weekly Friday prayer), Ramadan (holy month), hajj (pilgrimage), khutbah’s (sermons), madrasas (Islamic learning centres) waqfs (charitable endowments), and shared Qur’anic Arabic as a lingua-franca. But Stephen Dale’s study of the empires situated Islam at the heart of his comparison – and is therefore more appropriate for discerning religious and cultural differences – and concluded that religion impacted the empires populations and social compositions in a variety of ways. Basic religious demographics show that Ottomans were largely Sunni, Safavids were majority Shi’a, and Mughals contained a variety of Sunni, Shi’i, and Sufi blends in which the Muslims were the minority to the Hindu majority. But closer analysis reveals that these distinctions were far more complex and deep-rooted, both in the empire’s interpretation and application of Islam. The Safavids were founded upon Ismail’s claim to be the Mahdi (“Guided One”), the reincarnation of Ali (first Imam), and by espousing Twelver Shi’ism, and by Abbas’ reign, Shi’ism was the principal source of legitimacy. This branch rejected the caliphate and honoured the ‘Twelve Imams’ instead, believing them and the ‘House of Ali’ to be the rightful heirs of the Prophet. This conflicted with Sunni creed not least due to its rejection of the caliphate, but the esoteric, mystical, and messianic self-elevation of Ali, the Imams, and Ismail were deemed complete “innovations” and far removed from Islamic orthodoxy and the Shari’a.
‘Sunnism’ revolved around jurisprudence and the extraction of law from the authentic Qur’an and hadiths, meaning compliance to the Khalifa (enforcer of law) and ulama (interpreters of law). Islamic commentators depict the Mughals and Ottomans as representatives of the Hanafi Sunni creed, but this ignores the array of Sufi tariqas within its principalities and the Sufi saints within their bureaucracies. Indeed, the Sunni-Shi’a split was not chronic with Mughal and Ottoman Shi’as and Safavid Sunnis coexisting, Sunnism and Shi’ism being multifaceted within themselves as there were different Sunni schools of thought (Hanafi, Hanbali, Shafi’I, Maliki) and numerous Shi’i creeds (i.e. ‘Fiver’ and ‘Sevener’ Shi’ism), as well as the Safavid imposition of Shi’ism being slow and fragmented. But Streusand’s claim that this fractured nature “did not destroy the cultural unity of the Islamic world” can be contested. Religious friction was certainly felt within the empires as many Sunni ulama were forcibly converted, fled, or were executed under the Safavids, and the Ottoman’s killed thousands of Shi’i “traitors” after the Safavids advent. As mentioned before, Safavid ideology was founded upon opposition of the established order (ghuluww) and its rejection of Ottoman hegemony, and this culminated in the Battle of Chaldiran (1514) and the subsequent skirmishes and trade embargoes that followed. Shi’a-Sunni friction continued well into the 17th-century even after the Treaty of Zuhab (1639) established boundaries between the Safavids and Ottomans, a period which also saw the Mughal-Safavid War (1649-53), and although the dispute was based on territory (Kahandahar), religious sentiment certainly inflamed the conflict.
Religious differences also became systemised. ‘Confessionalization’, a theory used by historians of early modern Europe, describes the process in which church and state become absolutist polities through the combination of “confessional statements and church ordinances.” Streusand applies this theory to Safavids, believing their imposition of a new religious identity on its population resulted in a new national identity, and while they did not intend to, “their policy had that effect”. But ‘Confessionalization’ can also be applied to the Ottomans and Mughals. Osman, the eponymous Ottoman founder, said to his son Orhan:
“Son! Be careful about the religious issues before all other duties. The religious precepts build a strong state.”
Religion was central to Ottoman governance. Elaborating on the Sunnism of the Seljuk Turks, early Ottoman rulers articulated sovereignty through the constructions of imperial mosque complexes and enforcing the Shari’a. With the assumption of the Islamic Holy Lands, Mecca and Medina, after the annexation of Mamluk Egypt – a triumph more honourable to the Turkmen than the conquest of Constantinople – the Ottomans became guardians of the hajj (pilgrimage) and by extension, the “protectors of Islam”, as Ottoman Sultan’s assumed the caliphal title. Although largely symbolic, this implied ascendancy over other Muslim rulers as Islamic empires in Southeast Asia, Africa, and even India, looked to the Ottomans as the maintainers of the Islamic world, evidenced by Mughal Akbar’s (1556-1605) large donations to Mecca in late 16th-century. ‘Confessionalization’ is also seen with the Mughals, as Akbar’s religious reforms sought foster unity among the various competing religious factions and unite his dynasty. “Sulh-i-kull” (“lasting reconciliation”) aimed to pacify tensions and increase toleration of other faiths, while Tauhid-i-ilahi (Divine Monotheism) integrated various strands of religious beliefs under one faith. Jahangir (1605-1628) failed to build on his father’s reforms, but his words perfectly captured the religious variations among the empires:
“... in Iran there is room for Shi’as only, in Turkey, India, and Turan there is room for Sunnis only ... in his [Akbar’s] dominions ... there was room for the professors of opposite religions, and for beliefs good and bad, and the road to altercation was closed.”
Aurangzeb (1658-1707) reversed these changes, believing the cultural patronage of his predecessors to be spendthrift and against Islamic spirit. Instead, he implemented the Fatawa-e-Alamgiri (“Religious Decrees of Alamgir”) as the empires new legal code, a system law tailored towards India’s Muslims based on the Shari’a.
Therefore, in addition to theological and sectarian divisions, religious differences were exacerbated by the inconsistency of rulers as interpretation deviated from Emperor to Emperor, Shah to Shah, and Sultan to Sultan. This is most evident by the Mughals, with Akbar’s all-encompassing Tauhud al-ilahi being the polar opposite of Aurenghzeb’s Fatawa-e-Alamgiri, but can also be seen with the Safavids, as Shah Abbas I’s religious beliefs were often described as ‘ambiguous’, as he showed interest in Nuqtafi heresy and Christian missionaries. His successor, Shah Safi (1629-1642), was less ambiguous as he returned to patronising Shi’a institutions, but then returned to ambiguity under Abbas II (1642-1666) as despite his continued promotion of Shi’ite doctrine, he also showed interest in messianic splinter groups and esoteric sects. This difference mirrored the Ottomans in the 17th-century, as Sultan Ahmed I’s (1603-1617) main interests revolved around observing the Shari’a, promoting religious scholarship, and building the illustrious ‘Blue Mosque’ in Istanbul. But after his death, palace politics dominated the empire and his successive rulers were unable to assert any religious influence. This is best encapsulated by Sultan Mehmed IV (1648-1687) who had the second longest reign of any Ottoman Sultan yet managed to assert no religious or historic impact.
Examples of religious toleration existed in all three empires as non-Muslims were incorporated into their communities – an Islamic principle that began from their 7th-century conquests. Although one might believe this to be a unifying factor, the extent to religious toleration again differed ruler to ruler. Shah Abbas II was notorious for his harsh treatment of non-Shi’as, forcing Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians to convert and executing Sunnis, but this changed under his successor Safi Mirza (1666-1694). Aurangzeb divides historiography as some portray his religious conservatism as bigoted intolerance, whilst others note his marriage to the Hindu Rajput princess, Nawab Bai, and building of Hindu temples. The Ottomans religious toleration is perhaps most known, but they too deviated from time to time. Sultan Selim II (1566-1574) and Mehmed III (1595-1603) persecuted many Shi’as during their conflict with the Safavids, and many Ottoman clerics condemned Sufi practices such as tomb visitation as they departed from the Shari’a, despite the vast Sufi-Ottoman population. Despite the undeniable cultural similarities between the empires with Persian art and architecture sweeping through the region during the 17th-century, this becomes the backdrop of a vast social and religious differentiation which prevented any form of association which allowed their similarities to be meaningful. Although not fixed barriers, the empires differences came to define them politically, militarily, economically, and religiously.